The scheme
The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIA) formed in February 2009 is set to provide a unique number to all Indian citizens by 2011, at a cost presently estimated between Rs.30,000 to Rs.150,000 crores, with initial budgeted outlay of Rs.100 crores for the current year. It is expected to create 100,000 new jobs and business worth Rs.6,500 crores. UIA will create and operate a database to create a Multi-purpose National Identity Card for all citizens over 18 years of age, with a unique number along with photographs and biometric data. It will link together various existing identity databases like passports, ration cards, licences and border area ID cards, to empower poor people by reducing or eliminating the need for them to bribe corrupt officials, and also address the widespread corruption in provision of subsidies and poverty alleviation programs like the NREG scheme, and check illegal immigration and terrorist threats. It is understood that providing smart cards is not included in the UI scheme, and that though obtaining the UI will not be mandatory, lack of UI may result in denial of facilities that call for it.
While any task is open to improvement, and it is not the present writer’s intention to belittle the efforts of government to create a database that will be of future value, it is well to address what may be the practical difficulties based upon known circumstances and facts, especially in rural areas.
Data acquisition
The scope of the UI scheme appears to be substantially much wider than any existing database such as passport, ration card, Electors Photo Identity Card (EPIC), etc. The target date of 2011 leaves only 29 months to formulate the scheme, create the personnel infrastructure, acquire data, perform data entry and validation, and put the database into operation. Obviously the system will be of use only with periodic updating continuously into the future, for which permanent systems will have to be set up starting with the immediately created personnel infrastructure. Updating involves continually obtaining raw data of people as they attain the age of 18 years and deleting the UI of persons who die, migrate or emigrate. While the number of data records involved in the updating process will be enormous, the creation of the initial database is monumental and is itself a moving target, since about 50,000 people cross Age-18 every day. At present, persons above 18 years of age number over 700 million, and would have increased by around 40 million by 2011.
Besides its design, the validity of a database scheme depends upon the accuracy or reliability of information, the speed with which it is acquired, and the rate and periodicity at which update information arrives. Personal raw data (photograph, demographic, biometric, links with other databases, etc.) has to be acquired by some person at the ground level by actual contact with individuals. The experience with provision of EPICs ordered by the Election Commission of India (ECI) is well known. The data needed for EPICs is limited; photograph, name, sex, date of birth, and address. Even with this limited data, large numbers of EPICs are known to be erroneous (with serious errors especially in sex and age, and photographs of very poor quality) primarily because of careless data entry by hired personnel of the contracted agency, which made the excuse of illegible raw data provided by the electors.
Biometric data for the UI database would perhaps be height, colour of eyes, fingerprints and blood group. To acquire this data, actual measurement of height, noting eye-colour and testing for blood-group would have to be made, since ration cards do not carry these details and the percentage of Indians who have passports is negligible. Thus, besides identifying individuals correctly before acquiring their biometric data, the accuracy and reliability of this data of people who live in accessible and interior villages (where over 60% of Indians live) would be heavily dependent upon the training and sincerity of persons who are appointed to go to the people to record it. There is virtually no accountability of the enumerators for the accuracy or reliability of the data acquired especially since, with a deadline of 2011, they are likely to rush to provide the volume of raw data called for by the UI Authority. Finally, the UI Authority will have no means of verifying the accuracy of the raw data flowing in from distant locations all over the country. Even if spot checking is done and errors detected, correction will be a challenging task. Thus the value of the UI database can be seriously compromised.
Collection of raw data could be delegated to the existing official administrative infrastructure. For elections or census, teachers and other government officials are made to carry out enumeration, to the neglect of their routine duties. But whether the UI Authority uses the existing official administrative infrastructure or outsources the work to contractors for enumeration (creation of 100,000 jobs and Rs.6,500 crores business), the common denominator is likely to be the validity of the incoming data.
Logistics and cost
The logistics of biometric data acquisition are enormous. The logistics that the ECI mobilizes for elections is huge and is done only when elections are due, but the UI Authority’s logistic needs would be continuous and on-going even beyond the target of 2011 set for database creation. The financial cost of upto Rs.150,000 crores may be accepted by Parliament, but the benefits of creation and maintenance of the database may also need to be quantified, howsoever approximately.
Rights issues
Obtaining the UI Number is not mandatory. Thus people who would want the UI Number but to whom there is little access because of living in remote areas, and people who are absent from their home when the enumerator visits would not be blamed. But such people and also genuine citizens who exercise their right not to obtain a UI Number will inevitably be confused with people who do not want to be identified either because they are illegal immigrants from neighbouring countries or because they have nefarious or anti-national aims. Such inevitable confusion would make genuine citizens without UI Numbers targets for police or other checks, and consequent loss of rights. At the same time, making UI Number mandatory may bring up constitutional issues because of the State assuming the restrictive role of “Big Brother” that limits or restricts individual freedoms. Therefore the concept of UI Number is one that perhaps calls for urgent legal discussion.
Conclusion
Government of India has created the UI Authority in February 2009 with laudable aims. However, the information placed in the public domain is negligible. The entire issue demands more transparency and public debate, and should not become yet another scheme created by the bureaucratic mindset that fails to deliver planned results, especially with the huge outlays suggested.
By Dr.S.G.Vombatkere
Dr.S G Vombatkere is the President of Mysore Grahakara Parishat