Saturday 9 June 2012

Supreme Court ruling on car window films

The Supreme Court has recently (27-4-2012) passed an order on use of films on vehicle windscreens and windows. Different papers have reported it differently, police all over the country are taking action and MGP has received numerous queries on the exact meaning of the judgment. The order passed by a three-man bench consisting of Chief Justice S.H. Kapadia and Justices A.K. Patnaik and Swatanter Kumar is available here. A careful reading of the text reveals ambiguities which we were not able to resolve. We will first give what the law says and then list some of the unresolved ambiguities and inconsistencies in the judgment.   
Sec. 100 of the Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 (MVR) is the law which deals with vehicle windscreens and windows. According to it, the glass of windscreens and the windows of every motor vehicle should be made of safety glass. The glass of the windscreen and rear window should have a VLT (visible light transmittance) of 70% or more and the VLT of the side windows should be 50% or more. VLT is just a technical name for transparency and so a black glass which does not allow any light to pass has 0 % VLT and a perfectly transparent glass has 100% VLT. It is significant that the law is silent on films applied to car windows.  
 The judgment interprets the 70% and 50% VLT levels specified in the law to refer to the  time of manufacture of the safety glasses and hence prohibits application of any film to the glasses. This interpretation is contrary to that given in other countries. For example, Sec. 100 of the MVR is very similar to the applicable law in the UK (Regulations 31 and 32 of the The Road Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations 1986) which prescribes VLT limits of 75% and 70%. Neither the Indian law nor the UK law mentions films, but the UK law is interpreted to permit films on glasses as long as the VLT limits are satisfied. Higher courts in India generally refer to interpretations of similar laws in other countries, especially UK, but it has not been done here. It would have been nice if the Supreme Court had considered the interpretation of the UK law and explained why it may not be applicable.  
Now some of the ambiguities, inaccuracies, inconsistencies and typos which detract from the solemnity of the Supreme Court judgment.  
The judgment prohibits the use of "black films of any VLT percentage". Black films have a VLT of 0% and if the VLT is neither 0% or 100%, the film is grey and not black. So the words "black films of any VLT percentage" used throughout the judgment is confusing.  
Para 3 of the judgment says "The glasses of the vehicles having a coating of black films cannot be termed as 'tinted glasses'". The Court seems to be under the mistaken impression that Sec. 100 of the MVR permits tinted glasses on automobiles. But Sec. 100 of the MVR speaks only of the VLT of the windows, but does not refer to "tinted glasses".  
Para 8 of the judgment says that black film on vehicle glasses is banned in Afghanistan, Belarus, Nigeria, Uganda and Pakistan. It also says that use of black films is not prevalent in United States of America, United Kingdom, Germany and other countries as well. But this is not true. Window films are allowed in the USA, UK and Germany. In fact, all the European countries allow films on vehicle glasses, but some countries such as France and Spain do not permit it on the windshield.  
One of the reasons put forth in the judgment to extend Sec. 100 of the MVR to completely prohibit film on car windows is the fact that luxmeters (instruments which measure VLT of glass) are a "scarce" resource and "is very scantily available with the police personnel in India".  But luxmeters are quite cheap (Rs. 2000-2500 per unit and probably cheaper if purchased in bulk) and there is no reason the police can not afford them. Also, lack of equipment can not be a reason for reinterpreting the law.  
In Para 18, the judgment says "Another adverse aspect of use of black films is that even if they reflect tolerable VLT in the day time, still in the night it would clearly violate the prescribed VLT limits and would result in poor visibility, which again would be impermissible." Since VLT is just another name for transparency, it can not change from daytime to nighttime. Further, "reflecting tolerable VLT" is difficult to understand. This para is quite confusing.  
Para 27 of the judgment prohibits the use of black films of any VLT percentage or any other material upon vehicle glasses, but, the next para omits the words "or any other material". It is not known if the omission is intentional and not a typographical error.  
 Para 19 of the judgment speaks of police authorities from the "states of Calcutta, Tamil Nadu and Delhi". It should have been West Bengal and not Calcutta.  
A review petition to the Supreme Court may clear up these anomalies in the present judgment and give a clearer interpretation of the law about the use of films on car windows.
Dwarkanath Narayan, Mysore Grahakara Parishat